Hospital Inefficiency: What is the Impact of Membership in Different Types of Systems?
The primary objective of this study is to assess whether systematic differences in inefficiency are associated with hospital membership in different types of systems. We employed the Battese/Coelli simultaneous stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) technique to estimate hospital cost inefficiency. Mean estimated inefficiency was 8.42%. Membership in different types of systems was related to estimated cost inefficiency (p , .05). Compared to hospitals that were members of centralized health systems, membership in centralized physician/insurance or decentralized systems was associated with decreased inefficiency; membership in independent systems was associated with increased inefficiency.
Substantial restructuring and consolidation of the hospital industry have occurred over the last decade. In particular, between 1994 and 2004, 517 community hospitals joined multihospital systems, which resulted in an increase over the period in the proportion of hospitals that were system affiliated from 40.2% to 54.2%. Looking strictly at urban community hospitals, the proportion belonging to systems grew from 44.8% to 64% between 1994 and 2004. 1 This consolidation of the industry has motivated research on the effects of system membership on hospitals' quality and continuity of care, financial performance, and efficiency (Bazzoli et al. 2000; Carey 2003; Conrad and Shortell 1996; Robinson 1997; Shortell 1988) . With respect to the latter, early researchers investigated system membership as a potential source of firm-level scale and scope economies. Arguably, systems may achieve greater efficiency because the production of multiple products in different hospitals allows the employment of a more richly specialized group of managers and technical experts than can be done in a smaller enterprise. Systems also may allow for the elimination of duplicative administrative functions. Other cost savings attributed to system affiliation include: 1) reduced interest rates in capital markets; 2) human resource benefits such as improved recruiting; 3) greater ability to control environmental factors; 4) lower malpractice premiums; and 5) economies in marketing a large organization rather than several smaller firms (Ermann and Gabel 1985) .
However, despite these potential advantages, most empirical research has not found significant cost advantages between independent and system-affiliated hospitals (Carey 2003) . One reason for the lack of consistent results may be the overly simplistic treatment of system membership in studies that use a binary variable (where 1 indicates system membership and 0 indicates that the hospital is not in a system, or binary variables for the interactions between system membership and ownership ([i.e., public, private for-profit, and private not-for-profit] and for duration of membership). These approaches do not recognize differences in system characteristics and assume all types of systems have the same impact on performance. Bazzoli and colleagues (1999) recognized that differences among systems may be due to factors more complex than ownership or duration, and they conducted cluster analyses on measures of differentiation, integration and centralization that suggested the existence of a five-category system taxonomy. The system types within this taxonomy are centralized systems, centralized physician/insurance systems, moderately centralized systems, decentralized systems, and independent systems (brief descriptions of the characteristics of these system types can be found in Table 1 ). In a follow-up study, they reported that financial performance may be affected by membership in different types of health care systems (Bazzoli et al. 2000) , but they did not specifically examine the efficiency implications of different system configurations.
In this study, we examine whether hospital inefficiency varies as a result of membership in different types of systems. In a world characterized by constrained resources for health care services, improving efficiency is important as this allows more services to be produced from a constant level of resources without compromising quality. Efforts to study and improve this important dimension of performance have been hindered by an absence of valid measures. The development of frontier methods (i.e., data envelopment analysis [DEA] and stochastic frontier analysis [SFA] ) was thought to have created a breakthrough that would allow the valid measurement of efficiency in health care Centralized physician/insurance health systems These systems have centrally organized physician and insurance arrangements, but they exhibit only moderate centralization in the delivery of hospital services. These systems tend to have fewer hospitals. System members are less likely to be investor-owned and more likely to be located close to each other.
Moderately centralized health systems
Moderately centralized systems give more autonomy to member hospitals with regard to organizing hospital services, physician arrangements, and insurance activity. They are characterized by moderate levels of centralization for all types of services and arrangements. These systems have relatively high numbers of church-affiliated hospitals.
Decentralized health systems These systems are characterized by a high level of decentralization. System members provide a higher percentage of their services at the individual hospital level and are characterized by decentralized physician and insurance arrangements. Hospitals in decentralized systems are more likely to be sponsored by religious organizations and dispersed over a broad geographic area.
Independent hospital systems
Independent systems have little or no centralization of hospital services. System hospitals also have few physician arrangements or insurance products. Hospitals that belong to independent systems are often smaller and located in rural areas. Independent systems have more investor-owned hospitals than other systems.
organizations. Using SFA, we find that the structural characteristics of systems can have an impact on the cost inefficiency of member hospitals.
Whether the type of system joined, as opposed to membership in any system, bears on hospital inefficiency is important from both a managerial and policy perspective. Health system executives who are concerned about improving efficiency and overall financial performance can use the results of efficiency studies to improve their system configuration. Antitrust enforcement agencies, on the other hand, have always been concerned about the balance between efficiency gains resulting from consolidation, which have positive social welfare effects, and the detrimental effect of increased market power, which can lead to higher hospital prices. Our results provide insights on whether certain types of system configurations (i.e., those associated with higher levels of cost inefficiency in their member hospitals) should be more closely scrutinized by antitrust enforcers.
Synthesis of Prior Research and Conceptual Underpinnings
Since Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni's (1994) seminal article, at least 19 studies of U. S. hospitals focusing on SFA-derived inefficiency scores have been published (Rosko and Mutter in press) . Among these, two focused on the relationship between system membership and efficiency (Carey 2003; Rosko and Proenca 2005) . Further, Rosko (2001a) included system membership as a binary control variable in a study that examined the impact of health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration on hospital efficiency. This study found that systemaffiliated hospitals tended to be more efficient than nonsystem hospitals. However, as we noted previously, mere membership in a system is unlikely to drive performance.
Differences in governing structure and administrative staffing across the five-category system taxonomy suggest that there may be differences in efficiency related to system type (Alexander, Lee, and Bazzoli 2003) . In developing the taxonomy, the key discriminating feature was the degree of centralization, defined as the extent to which services, physician relationships, and development of insurance products occur at the system as opposed to the hospital level of organization (Bazzoli et al. 1999 ). As such, the degree of centralization is a reflection of how much autonomy a hospital retains or surrenders in becoming a system member.
Two theories inform the circumstances determining whether organizations will surrender autonomy in inter-organizational relationships in exchange for improved performance. Resource dependence theory views organizational actions as rational, deliberate attempts to reduce dependence on other organizations in the environment that control critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . Organizations act to lower the level of uncertainty in their environment by securing a stable flow of resources. Transaction cost economics (TCE) can be applied to interchanges between collaborating organizations as well as the intra-organizational workings of firms (Williamson 1991) . A fundamental principle of TCE is that organizations incur costs as a result of planning, implementing, and enforcing exchanges with other organizations. Costs can include contract negotiations, monitoring adherence to contractual terms, providing financial incentives or penalties, and losses resulting from supplier noncompliance.
Resource dependence theory would argue that more centralized systems have advantages in resource procurement over systems in which hospitals have more autonomy. Centralized decision making allows for a unified and prompt reaction to environmental conditions. In addition, centralization enables systems to leverage their concentrated bargaining power in negotiations with purchasers and vendors. Arguing from a TCE perspective, centralization reduces the monitoring and coordination costs both within the system and with outside parties, eliminating duplication and lowering overhead costs. Thus, both perspectives would associate centralization with greater efficiency.
However, there may be limits to the advantages of centralization. From a contingency perspective, the optimal organizational structure is the one that provides the best fit within the operating environment (Haige and Aiken 1969) . Centralization may have diminishing returns with respect to efficiency if bureaucratic, unilateral decision making hinders the ability of the system to respond to local contingencies. High centralization may increase both internal and external transaction costs as opportunities are lost due to a lack of local contracting flexibility. This suggests that moderately centralized systems will be more efficient than either decentralized or highly centralized systems.
Using the system typology developed by Bazzoli and colleagues, Carey examined the level of cost inefficiency of hospitals in the five different types of systems. Carey found weak evidence of an association between membership in one type of system (namely, centralized physician-insurance systems) and hospital inefficiency. In contrast, Rosko and Proenca (2005) found that hospital cost inefficiency was inversely related to the percentage of services that hospitals offer through their system affiliation. This measure was intended to reflect the degree of centralization of service delivery. Although these results suggest a relationship between centralization and efficiency, a major shortcoming of their study is that every service was given the same weight.
While SFA results in general are fairly robust, inefficiency estimates can be very sensitive to some model variations (Coelli, Rao, and Battese 1999; Rosko and Mutter in press) . For example, the analysis of the impact of firm-specific and environmental factors on inefficiency has been conducted in one stage (Pitt and Lee 1981; Linna 1998; Rosko 2001b) or two stages (Timmer 1971; Vitaliano and Toren 1996; Rosko 1999; Carey 2003) . In the two-stage approach, inefficiency scores are calculated in the first-stage stochastic frontier regression estimation procedure. Then, in the second stage, these estimates are regressed against a set of factors thought to be correlated with inefficiency. However, Coelli (1996) argues that the two-stage estimation procedure is unlikely to provide estimates that are as efficient as those that could be obtained using a single-stage or simultaneous estimation procedure. Rosko (2003) suggested that Carey's (2003) conclusion that membership in most health care system types did not have a significant association with cost inefficiency might have been due to the application of the twostage SFA method, which inflated the variance of the parameter estimates. In this study, we use SFA to simultaneously estimate the cost inefficiency of hospitals and determine the impact of membership in different types of systems on this important dimension of hospital performance.
Methods

Data Sources
This study is based on data for 1,144 U.S. short-term, general, urban, system-member hospitals for the year 2001.
2 A larger sample of 1,842 hospitals, which also included nonsystem hospitals, was used to calculate an inverse Mill's ratio to implement a Heckman correction procedure for selection bias. The analysis is restricted to primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSA) because existing research suggests that it may not be appropriate to pool data from urban and rural hospitals (Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni 1994; Folland and Hofler 2001) . Further, concerns have been raised about the quality of data for a key control variable, HMO penetration, for rural areas (Gaskin and Hadley 1997) .
A comparison of the study hospitals with hospitals omitted because they were located in rural areas indicates that these hospitals have very different characteristics. Compared to excluded hospitals, the study hospitals are much larger, more likely to be academic medical centers, and more likely to be located in areas with much higher HMO penetration and less market concentration. Accordingly, generalizations to non-study hospitals should not be made.
The primary sources for hospital-level data were the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals and Medicare Hospital Cost Reports. HMO data was supplied by Solucient. The market area for exogenous variables such as the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration was defined as the county. However, a broader market area, the PMSA, was used for some variables such as input prices because this level of aggregation reduces the influence of study hospitals in the area averages.
Research Design
We estimate cost inefficiency with a one-stage method; however, for comparative purposes we also conduct a two-stage approach. In addition to concerns about the efficiency of the two-stage estimation procedure (Coelli 1996) , Wang and Schmidt (2002) found that the two-stage procedure may result in substantially biased estimates of technological parameters and inefficiency levels.
We assume that costs are determined as follows:
where, TC represents total costs; Y is a vector of outputs; W is a vector of input prices; and e is the error term, which can be decomposed as follows:
where v is statistical noise (i.e., assumed to be distributed as N [0, s 2 ]) and u consists of positive departures from the cost frontier and represents cost inefficiency or the percentage by which observed costs exceed minimum costs predicted for the best practice cost frontier (Lovell 1994) . The observations are indexed by a hospital index, i 5 1, 2,…, 1,144.
Model Specification
In this analysis, the general form of the translog cost model used for the stochastic frontier of hospitals is:
where:
TC 5 total costs; Y 5 outputs; W 5 input prices; PD 5 inpatient and outpatient product descriptors; TEACH 5 binary teaching status variables; and v i and u i are random variables described previously. Jondrow and colleagues (1982) derived an estimation of one-sided residuals (i.e., u i ) interpreted as inefficiency scores. The estimated value of the efficiency score depends upon the assumed inefficiency distribution. There are a number of feasible distributional assumptions for the residuals, including the normal-half-normal, gamma, normal-exponential, and normal-truncated distributions (Greene 1994) . Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed a model for panel data in which the inefficiency effects are defined by:
where: Z it is a vector of explanatory variables associated with the inefficiency effects; e is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; and w it are unobservable random variables, assumed to be independently distributed, obtained by truncation of the normal distribution with mean zero and unknown variance, s
This is an attractive model because it can be used to explain the impact of firm-specific, system-related, and environmental factors on inefficiency, which is the primary purpose of this study (Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar, and Heshmati 1996) . This model also can be applied to cross-sectional data by imposing the restriction t 5 1 (Coelli, Rao, and Batteese 1999) .
The parameters of the cost frontier were estimated simultaneously by a maximum likelihood method using the FRONTIER 4.1 program (Coelli 1996) . The cost ineffi-ciency of the ith hospital is defined as the ratio of observed total costs to the stochastic frontier total costs. The stochastic frontier total costs are defined by the value total costs would be if best-practice efficiency were achieved.
Cost Function Variables
The standard assumption of linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by normalizing the equation by the wage rate. Thus, the dependent variable is the logarithm of total expenses divided by the wage rate. Similarly, the price of capital and the wage rate are divided by the wage rate. Outpatient visits and inpatient admissions to short-term hospital units are included as outputs in the cost function.
3 Since resource consumption varies dramatically among patients classified in different diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), we adjust admissions by the Medicare CaseMix Index (MCMI) to reflect cost variations associated with case-mix complexity. The MCMI weights reflect the relative costliness of DRGs into which a hospital's patients have been classified. A study of Pennsylvania hospitals found that the MCMI is highly correlated (r . .90) with a DRG case-mix index based on all patients (Rosko and Carpenter 1994) .
In addition, OTHERDAYS, a variable representing all other patient days (i.e., from units such as long-term care and hospice) has been entered as another output variable. This output is expressed in terms of patient days rather than discharges because the average length of stay (. 30 days) is much longer and more variable than that of traditional inpatient hospital units. The results of a Hausman specification test (p . .05) suggest that hospital outputs can be treated as exogenous, an assumption common to hospital cost studies (Grannemann, Brown, and Pauly 1986) . The continuous output and input price variables all were measured in natural logs, except for OTHERDAYS, which was BoxCox transformed (lambda 5 .3603) because some hospitals had values of zero for this variable.
To control variations in output, we have included several product descriptor variables. OPDSURG%, the ratio of outpatient surgeries to total outpatient visits, is used to control for variations in outpatient department output. Patients who require surgery tend to be a more resource-intensive group of outpatients (Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni 1994; Dor and Farley 1996; Rosko 2001b) . The other product descriptors in our model include an index of eight high-technology services (HITECH) (see Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni 1994) and a risk-adjusted index of inpatient mortality. The former was developed from AHA data and the latter was supplied by Solucient and was based on Medicare data. The mortality index (MOR-TINDEX) was calculated by dividing the hospital's actual mortality rate by its expected mortality rate (based on risk factors such as age and diagnoses); a higher value reflects poorer outcomes. While we expect HITECH to be positively associated with expenses (since these services are very expensive), a priori expectations could not be developed for MORTINDEX. Poorer quality can be associated with lower costs if it is the result of skimping on services, or it can be associated with higher costs if poorer ''measured quality'' is associated with unmeasured acuity, which can increase both costs and mortality rates.
Teaching hospitals not only produce different outputs than nonteaching hospitals, they also may have different goals. Accordingly, teaching status is entered into the model by two binary variables: 1) hospitals with membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH), and 2) other teaching hospitals (OTHERTEACH). COTH members tend to have a greater commitment to medical education than non-COTH teaching hospitals. For example, in our analytical file, the mean number of full-time equivalent (FTE) residents was more than 200 in COTH-member hospitals and about 25 in other teaching hospitals. The use of binary teaching variables rather than a continuous measure of teaching output makes the implicit assumption of exogeneity more defensible. Further, the teaching variables may control some variations in quality (Taylor, Whellan, and Sloan 1999) .
Two inputs, capital and labor, are recognized in the cost function. The price of labor was approximated by the area average annual salary per full-time-equivalent employee, and the price of capital was approximated by depreciation and interest expenses per bed. For both inputs, the average price was computed for all short-term general hospitals in the PMSA where the study hospital was located. A more complete specification of input prices would be desirable. However, given the relatively poor quality of input price information, we follow past practices (Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni 1994; Grannemann, Brown, and Pauly 1986) and use this limited set of price variables. The model assumes that excluded input prices are proportional across hospitals. Hausman tests could not reject exogeneity (p . .05) for the price of capital variable.
Inefficiency Effects Variables
To test the association between membership in different types of system clusters and hospital inefficiency, a vector of four binary variables representing the system types identified by Bazzoli et al. (1999) was included in the model as inefficiency effects. The reference category is the centralized system cluster. Some researchers have expressed concern about selection bias for system membership (Menke 1997; Bazzoli et al. 2001; Carey 2003) . Accordingly, we performed a Heckman correction for selection. To implement this, we first estimated a probit equation for system selection in the larger sample of 1,842 hospitals. (The selection model and probit results are available from the authors at http://muse.widener.edu/SBA/INQUIRY_ 2007_Appendix_System_Choice.pdf.) Using the probit model results, we next calculated an inverse Mill's ratio (Greene 2003) , which was included in the SFA model that included only system hospitals. The estimated coefficient of the inverse Mill's ratio was significant (p , .01), supporting the use of this correction procedure. 4 In addition, a set of control variables used in a previous study of hospital inefficiency was included (Rosko 2001b) : HMO penetration (HMO%), Medicare share (MEDI-CARE%) and Medicaid share of discharges (MEDICAID%), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of adjusted admissions, for-profit (FP) private ownership status, and government ownership (GOVT). These variables control for external environment pressures for efficiency associated with private and public payment policy and the degree of market competition as well as internal pressures for efficiency associated with ownership. Table 2 presents the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the stochastic frontier regression equation.
Model Selection and Specification
It is possible to use a variety of specifications to estimate a stochastic frontier cost function. To guide model selection, we tested several restrictions; Table 3 summarizes the results of hypothesis tests-likelihood ratio (LR) teststhat examined the restrictions. The hypothesis tests, involving the parameters of the stochastic cost frontier, were obtained using the generalized likelihood statistic, l. This is defined by l 5 22(ln(LH 0 )) 2 ln(L(H 1 )). L(H 0 ) and L(H 1 ) are the values of the likelihood function under the null (i.e., restricted version of the model) and alternate (i.e., unrestricted version) hypotheses. If the null hypothesis is true, l has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of parameters estimated under H 1 and H 0 (Coelli et al. 1999 ). Chi-square statistics (or mixed Chi-square) with critical values at the p , .05 level are used to test the hypotheses.
It is necessary to determine whether the stochastic frontier technique is more appropriate than ordinary least squares (OLS). In the estimation of the stochastic frontier, Battese and Corra (1977) ). Larger values of c imply that the variance of the inefficiency effects represent larger proportions of the total variance of the error terms, u and v.
The restriction that c equals zero can be tested to determine whether stochastic frontier regression is appropriate. If the null hypothesis c equals zero cannot be rejected, this implies that s u 2 is zero. If so, the u i term should be removed from the model, leaving a specification with parameters that can be consistently estimated using ordinary least squares (Coelli 1996) . The LR test strongly supported (p , .01) the use of stochastic frontier regression. Newhouse (1994) criticized the use of SFA because there is no a priori justification for the use of any particular distribution for the technical inefficiency effects, u i . Stevenson (1980) partially addressed this concern by specifying a truncated-normal distribution, which is a generalization of the half-normal distribution. Since the half-normal distribution is a special case of the truncated-normal distribution where m 5 0, the appropriateness of using the half-normal distribution was assessed by testing H 0 : m 5 0. As Table 3 summarizes, this hypothesis was rejected and the truncated-normal distribution was used in the final model. However, two things should be noted. First, the results were very robust over alternate specifications of m. The simple correlation of the inefficiency scores estimated with the two distributions exceeded .98. This is consistent with the cross-sectional findings of Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni (1994) as well as those from a wide variety of other industries (Coelli, Rao, and Batteese 1999) . Second, although the use of the halfnormal distribution can be tested because it is a special case of the truncated-normal distri- The Cobb-Douglas function is a special case of the translog function in which the parameters of the higher order output and input price variables are restricted to equal zero. The Cobb-Douglas frontier model was rejected. Finally, the hypothesis, d 1 5 … 5 d 11 5 0 was rejected. This implies that the exogenous inefficiency variables, as a group, have a significant impact on cost inefficiency.
In summary, the results of the restriction tests support the use of SFA, based on a translog cost function, with a composed error that assumes a truncated-normal distribution, and inefficiency effects related to cluster membership as well as internal (i.e., ownership) and external (i.e., payment policies) environmental factors.
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Results Table 4 presents the results for parameters estimated by the frontier cost function. Many of the interaction terms are insignificant. 6 However, this was not unexpected given their high intercorrelations. Further, although multicollinearity has an adverse effect on the reliability of the estimates for these variables, it does not introduce a bias in the parameter estimates. Given that this study does not focus on these parameters per se, we used the translog cost function based on the results of the previously discussed hypothesis test. However, the results from the two cost function models are highly correlated (r . .98), so choice of the model does not affect results very much. The parameter estimates for the teaching variables suggests that COTH-member and other teaching hospitals are 27.1% and 9.1% more expensive, respectively, than nonteaching hospitals even after controlling for case mix and availability of high-technology services. With one exception (MORTINDEX), each of the parameter estimates for the product descriptor variables was positive and significant at p , .01. This supports their validity as control variables.
The result for MORTINDEX does not necessarily imply that there is no relationship between quality and costs. While this outcome measure represents one aspect of the quality of care, it does not cover other important elements such as patient complications or errors in medical care. Thus, it may be that some unmeasured aspects of quality are affecting our results. However, this concern is mitigated by a number of factors. First, we also included some variables that are structural measures of quality (i.e., binary teaching variables and the index of hightechnology services). Secondly, other research (Rosko and Mutter in press) has found that the use of a set of 12 disease-specific riskadjusted mortality rates and patient-safety variables had minimal impact (approximately .4%) on estimated cost inefficiency. The results from the more complete model were highly correlated (.99) with the results derived from a model with the simple risk-adjusted mortality index. Each of the control variables among the inefficiency effects variables was significant except for MEDICAID% and HMO%. MEDICARE% had a negative coefficient, which suggests that hospitals were responding to the efficiency incentives provided by the Medicare prospective payment system. The signs of the other estimates were positive. The result for GOVT was consistent with the expectation that public hospitals are more inefficient. The result for FP, although contrary to expectations derived from property rights theory, is consistent with some previous studies that have used frontier methods (Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni 1994; Rosko 2001a; Ozcan, Luke, and Haksever 1992) , as well as those that used more traditional estimation techniques (Grannemann, Brown, and Pauly 1986; Institute of Medicine 1986) . A recent review of studies that compared hospitals' costs under different forms of ownership reported inconsistent results (Sloan 2000) . The positive estimate for HHI indicates that there is more cost inefficiency in markets where output is concentrated in fewer hospitals. This suggests that payer-driven competition is causing hospitals in more competitive markets (i.e., those with a lower HHI) to reduce inefficiency.
Three of the four coefficients for variables representing system type were significant (p , .01). Moderately centralized systems were the exception. This is in contrast to Carey (2003) , who found only one marginally significant (p , .10) estimate for the system-membership variables, but who used the less-efficient twostage estimation approach. As the bottom of Table 4 shows, the parameter estimates suggest that hospitals in centralized physician/ insurance health systems and decentralized health systems were the most efficient, while hospitals in the independent hospital system cluster were the least efficient.
The mean inefficiency estimates for the different system types are shown in Table 5 . The overall mean inefficiency estimate was about 8.42%. This is smaller than the range of estimates reported by Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni (1994) , but similar to more recent estimates (Folland and Hofler 2001; Rosko and Mutter in press) . The lower inefficiency estimates may be due to: a) the use of inefficiency effects variables to absorb heterogeneity, 7 b) a decrease in hospital inefficiency that may have been occurring over time (Rosko 2001b) , or c) the exclusion of nonsystem hospitals that, as a group, may be less efficient than system-member hospitals.
However, as expected, performance varied in different types of systems. Consistent with the regression results, the mean inefficiency as reported in Table 4 was lowest in centralized physician/insurance health systems (4.05%) and decentralized health systems (6.55%). Hospitals in independent hospital systems tended to be the most inefficient (18.82%). The best performing hospital in an independent health system had an inefficiency score of 6.44%, a value that ranks it below most of the hospitals in the centralized physician/ insurance health system cluster.
It should be noted that there is some controversy surrounding the use of costefficiency estimates. For example, Newhouse (1994) and Street (2003) have expressed strong reservations against their use for payment purposes. Others (Folland and Stano 2001; Rosko 2003; Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni 1994) concluded that it is appropriate to use group means of costinefficiency estimates for comparisons. Given some expressed concerns about point estimates, we also analyzed rankings. As Table 6 shows, substituting inefficiency rankings for the means of inefficiency point estimates had little impact on our main conclusions. Specifically, inefficiency rankings were best in centralized physician/insurance health systems and decentralized health systems, and worst in independent hospital systems. While hospitals in the other two systems still occupy the middle ground, their relative position changed. However, whether using a cardinal or ordinal metric, the differences between these two are not significant (p , .05). We also examined the characteristics of the best and worst performers. The top 10 performers had an average inefficiency score of 2.54%. All of the 10 best performers were members of either centralized physician/insurance health systems (seven) or decentralized health systems (three) and were comprised of private, not-for-profit hospitals (NFP). In contrast, the bottom 10 performers had an average inefficiency score of 55.74%. Among the 10 worst performers, five were in moderately centralized health systems and five were in independent hospital systems. Four of these were public hospitals and six were for-profit hospitals.
We also wanted to examine the robustness of estimates over different methods. We applied the two-stage approach to this data and found that three of the estimated coefficients of the system cluster variables were insignificant at the p , .05 level. The exception was the coefficient of independent systems variable, which was positive and significant (p , .01). In addition, three of the control variables (FP, GOVT, MEDI-CARE%) that were significant in the onestage model became insignificant in the twostage model. Thus, our results concur with Wang and Schmidt (2002) , who wrote, ''we would recommend against using two-step procedures in any circumstances we can envision'' (p. 140).
Discussion
There has been inconsistent evidence about the association between system membership and hospital performance. This may be due to the methods employed, especially the prevalent use of binary variables to represent system membership. It appears that system membership per se does not guarantee better efficiency. Rather, our results support the contention of Bazzoli and colleagues (2000) that the benefits of system membership depend upon system characteristics. Indeed, membership in the independent health systems cluster was found to be associated with increased cost inefficiency. As described in Table 1 , the structure of these ''systems'' provides little opportunity for centralized decision making. Perhaps hospitals joined this type of system only to increase the legitimacy conveyed by affiliating with a larger system rather than to increase efficiency.
Contrary to our expectations, moderately centralized systems did not have the most efficient hospitals. Instead, membership in centralized physician/insurance health systems and decentralized health systems was associated with the highest levels of efficiency. The results for centralized physician/insurance health systems suggest that the returns to centralization are more pronounced than we had anticipated. The descriptions of the system types indicate that centralized physician/insurance health systems are more centralized, in general, than moderately centralized systems but less than centralized health systems (Bazzoli et al. 1999) . The pattern of relative efficiency across systems suggests that the way in which systems centralize may have an impact on performance. Centralized physician/insurance systems have highly centralized physician and insurance arrangements, but only moderate levels of hospital service centralization. The fact that these systems had the highest level of efficiency in our study suggest that system benefits may be most likely to occur when member hospitals can avail themselves of centralized bargaining clout while also having the autonomy to customize service delivery to local market conditions. Bargaining clout comes from highly centralized physician/insurance arrangements and customization capability comes from moderately centralized service organization and delivery.
This explanation, however, does not account for the performance of decentralized health systems with respect to efficiency. An examination of their characteristics suggests two complementary possibilities. First, consistent with theoretical expectations, the greater autonomy of hospitals in this type of system allows them to respond more flexibly to local contingencies. Second, these hospitals might be exploiting the benefits of information sharing. The average number of hospitals in decentralized health systems is more than 40 (56.5 versus 8.27 in moderately centralized health systems), more than that for any other type of system. With this many hospitals, truly exceptional internal best practices may be easier to recognize and communicate. Further, it is important to note that the environment in which hospitals operated during the late 1990s and early 2000s was very turbulent. For example, in the aftermath of the Balanced Budget Act of 1996, Medicare margins fell from 11.5% in 1997 to 5% in 2001 5% in (MedPac 2005 . In the meantime, the power of HMOs declined.
With all these changes occurring, it could be that decentralized systems provided an advantage in allowing hospitals to respond to unique circumstances that might be arising locally. Of course, our suggestions about the genesis of the variation in performance are speculative. We hope that future research assesses this in more detail.
Our results also have some important methodological implications. We found that the use of two-stage and one-stage SFA estimation procedures can lead to very different results for policy-sensitive variables. According to Coelli (1996) , the one-stage approach has the advantage of producing more efficient parameter estimates. This may explain why three of four of our estimated regression coefficients for the system cluster variables were significant (p , .01) when we used the preferred one-stage approach; only one of Carey's (2003) estimates for these variables was marginally significant at p , .10. It is interesting to note that our results agreed with Carey's in terms of the extreme performers. In both studies, centralized physician/insurance health systems were found to be associated with the lowest levels of cost inefficiency, and independent health systems were associated with the most cost inefficiency. Indeed, the latter was the only system type that had a positive regression coefficient in both studies.
It is important to mention some limitations of our study. First, our results are estimates of relative cost inefficiency and may differ from ''true'' cost inefficiency. Although we included a large set of cost determinants, our results could be affected by omitted variables or measurement errors. Second, cost-inefficiency estimates are affected by assumptions about the residual. While there is a consensus that choice of distribution has little impact on the estimates of relative inefficiency of the members of a sample (and this was reflected by the very strong correlation we found between estimates based on the half-normal and truncated normal distributions), it can affect the magnitude of point estimates (Coelli, Rao, and Batteese 1999; Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000) . Consequently, while we are confident in the findings about the association of system membership type and relative inefficiency, we recognize that the mean values would change if a different theoretical probability distribution was chosen to represent the residual.
In conclusion, our results have provided more evidence about the association between system membership and hospital inefficiency. Thus, health system executives should be attentive to the structural design of their systems as certain features may influence the performance of member hospitals. Similarly, analysts with the antitrust agencies should consider the structural design of a system when assessing its potential social welfare effects, since realizing efficiency gains may depend on how systems are organized and structured. Although there is concern that consolidations increase market power and thus negotiated prices, it is possible that these adverse affects could be offset by efficiency gains if systems are structured with characteristics consistent with what Bazzoli and colleagues (1999) termed centralized physician/insurance health systems or decentralized health systems.
Notes
1 These values were derived through the authors' analyses of the 1994 and 2004 AHA Annual Survey public use files. 2 We deleted 257 observations because of missing or suspect data. Most of these did not supply information for services offered, data needed to construct the high-tech index variable. Eleven hospitals had implausibly high or low values for other variables. A disproportionate number of the deletions were for-profit hospitals. 3 Inpatient output also could be measured by inpatient days. However, a shorter length of stay (or fewer days) might be due to better discharge planning, which increases the efficiency of hospital operations (something an SFA study tries to measure), or quality or casemix variations (dimensions that should be controlled by other variables used in a cost inefficiency study). Further, an increase in patient days, holding constant the number of cases treated, quality, and case mix, implies more inefficiency and not more output. Another reason for not using both cases treated and either patient days or post-admission patient days, is that they are highly correlated. For example, in the analytical file used in this study the Pearson correlation for admissions and acute care unit patient days was greater than .93. Regression analysis indicates that the quality and case-mix control variables used in this study explain over 27% of the variation in average length of stay. So, the inclusion of patient days adds little information and contributes to the multicollinearity issues surrounding the use of the translog cost function. 4 We did not implement a Heckman correction procedure for each of the five types of system clusters because hospitals join particular types of systems for a wide range of reasons and not just to reduce inefficiency. Similarly, system structure relative to centralization versus decentralization may be driven by a wide range of environmental factors and may not represent a deliberate choice by the hospital to join a particular system type. 5 In addition to the SFA specification tests, we also checked for heteroskedasticity. We conducted Goldfeld-Quandt and Breusch-Pagan tests (Greene 2003) and neither could reject (p , .05) homoskedasticity in the cost function. 6 In the Cobb-Douglas model, each of the input price and output variables was significant (p , .05) and positive. To obtain a sense of the goodness-of-fit, we estimated an OLS regression for the translog and Cobb-Douglas versions of the cost function. The adjusted R-squares were .944 and .942, respectively. These suggest a very good fit to the data. 7 When inefficiency effects were not included, the mean estimated cost inefficiency was 10.2%.
